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Johnson: Administrative Law

ADMINISTRATIVE
I.

LAW

AMENDING OF CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE

In Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. South Carolina
Public Service Commission,I the supreme court reviewed an order
of the Commission granting an amended certificate of public convenience and necessity to a transportation corporation. The applicant, Infinger Transportation Company, Inc., already possessing a certificate authorizing motor freight service over certain
irregular routes within the state, applied to amend its certificate
to allow much broader service. Although the plaintiff and
Schwerman Trucking Company appeared to protest the application, the Commission granted the amendment "in order to better
serve the requirements of public convenience and necessity." ' In
a subsequent hearing the Commission merely affirmed its order,
concluding that Infinger's additional service would not have an
adverse effect upon the protesting companies' operations in the
state. The plaintiff then brought an action for judicial review of
the Commission's order, but the trial court dismissed the complaint.
In reviewing the order of the Commission, the supreme court
began by stating:
[O]rders of the Public Service Commission issued under
the powers and authority vested in it have the force and effect
of law .... [T]he Commission's findings of fact are presump-

tively correct and its orders presumptively reasonable and valid
• . .and ... therefore, an order of the Commission such as is

here involved will not be set aside except upon a convincing
showing that it is without evidence to support it or that3it embodies arbitrary or capricious action as a matter of law.
Such a showing is exactly what the court found in the record,
which disclosed merely that Infinger desired the amended certificate of service and that two prospective customers supported this
amendment. Additionally, testimony revealed that existing carriers had always satisfactorily met the needs of these two custom1.
2.
3.
Public

258 S.C. 518, 189 S.E.2d 296 (1972).
Id. at 521, 189 S.E.2d at 297.
Id. at 521-22, 189 S.E.2d at 297-98, quoting from Pee Dee Elec. Cooperative v.
Serv. Comm'n, 229 S.C. 155, 163, 92 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1956).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1973

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1973], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

ers and were willing if necessary to expand to meet any future
needs. Finding, therefore, that the action by the Commission in
granting the amendment was wholly without evidentiary support,
the supreme court reversed the lower court and set aside the order
of the Commission granting the amendment.
II.

REVOCATION OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE

In State Board of MedicalExaminers v. Gandy,4 the supreme
court for the second time considered the revocation of William
Gandy's license to practice medicine. In 1963 the Board revoked
Gandy's license but suspended the revocation for two years. In
1965, however, the Board revoked his license absolutely, based
upon a general finding of misconduct. The circuit court affirmed,
but the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for specific findings of factA On remand the Board issued a written order
revoking Gandy's license for "receiving stolen goods and public
drunkenness . . . as to violate the standards of the medical profession and constitute gross immorality under Section 56-1368 [of
the] South Carolina Code . ...I The circuit court, however,
determined that there was no evidence to support the charge of
receiving stolen goods and that public drunkenness alone was not
sufficiently grave to warrant a license revocation under section
56-1368.
The supreme court reinstated the decision of the Board to
revoke Gandy's license to practice medicine. It found that the
question was not whether Gandy had been guilty of misconduct
grave enough to justify revocation of his license. Instead, the issue
was whether he was guilty of misconduct during his probation
sufficient to justify revocation of his probation and enforcement
of the original judgment against him. When he was placed on
probation, he was allowed to continue practicing medicine, contingent upon his maintaining good behavior and a satisfactory
4. 258 S.C. 349, 188 S.E.2d 846 (1972).
5. See State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Gandy, 248 S.C. 300, 149 S.E.2d 644 (1966).
6. 258 SC. 349, 353, 188 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1972). S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1368 (Cum.
Supp. 1971) provides in part:
The grounds for revocation or suspension of a license shall be a satisfactory
showing to the Board of any of the following:
(2) That the holder of a license has been convicted of a felony or any other
crime involving moral turpitude, drugs or gross immorality.
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rehabilitation. This proceeding was instituted during the probationary period to determine if his alleged misconduct constituted
adequate grounds to enforce the original revocation. Therefore, to
support the finding that Gandy had violated the conditions of his
probation, it was not necessary to prove statutory "gross immorality" but rather only conduct not constituting "good behavior. "7 The supreme court found that there was ample evidence to
establish the charge of public drunkenness and to revoke the
probation:
The conduct of respondent-drunk, riding in his automobile with intoxicated minors, one of whom appeared to be
doped, and with phenobarbital tablets, which he was not allowed to dispense, scattered on the seat and in the glove compartment-failed to comport with standards of good behavior.
Such constituted ample ground for ending his probation and
enforcement of his previous license revocation.'
III.

LICENSE TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED DRUGS

The supreme court in Suber v. South CarolinaState Board
of Health9 reviewed the Board's refusal to grant the plaintiff, a
licensed podiatrist, a permit to dispense certain controlled drugs
pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. 0 This statute charges
the Board with the duty of administering the requirements relative to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of certain
controlled drugs. The plaintiff applied for a license to prescribe
and dispense these controlled drugs but was granted a license for
only one of the six categories, one containing primarily mild pain
relievers and analgesics. The plaintiff then instituted suit and
appealed to the supreme court when the lower court upheld the
Board's decision.
The plaintiff contended that as a licensed podiatrist he was
entitled to a permit to dispense all controlled drugs, but the
Board maintained that issuance of such permits was discretionary. The question, therefore, was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a permit solely because he was a licensed podiatrist or
7. "'Good behavior' is conduct authorized by or conformable to law." State v. Miller,
122 S.C. 468, 475, 115 S.E. 742, 745 (1923).
8.258 S.C. 349, 357, 188 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1972).
9. 193 S.E.2d 520 (S.C. 1972).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1510.21 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1971).
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whether the Board had the right, in the exercise of its discretion,
to refuse such a permit.
By statute the practice of podiatry is limited to the diagnosis
and medical and surgical treatment of local ailments of the
human foot, and a podiatrist is authorized to prescribe therapeutic drugs for the relief of such ailments." The Controlled Substances Act provides that "[p]ractitioners shall be registered to
dispense any controlled substances . . . in Schedules II through
V if they are authorized to dispense . . . under the law of this
State."'12 Since the statute defines "practitioner" to include a

podiatrist,'" the plaintiff contended that the Board was required
to register him to dispense all of the controlled drugs. The Controlled Substances Act, however, demonstrates a legislative intent that issuance of such a license be within the sound discretion
of the Board of Health. The statute actually requires that the
Board "shall register an applicant" only "if it determines that the
issuance of such registration is consistent with the public interest."' 4 Among the factors that must be considered in determining
public interest are "[s]uch other factors as may be relevant to
and consistent with the public health and safety."' 5 Therefore,
the supreme court affirmed the Board's decision that a medical
practitioner is entitled to a permit to dispense controlled drugs
only if the Board, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that
issuance of the permit is in the public interest.
IV.

ACTIONS BY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL COMMISSION

The supreme court affirmed the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Commission's suspension of a motel lounge owner's wine and beer
permit and possession and consumption permit in Winter v.
Pratt.6 The Commission, which had found the plaintiff guilty of
11. Id. § 56-1543.1.
12. Id. § 32-1510.42(c).
13. Id. § 32-1510.27 (Supp. 1972) provides in part:
"Practitioner" means:
(1) A physician, dentist, veterinarian, podiatrist,scientific investigator, or other
person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice or research in this State. [Emphasis added.]
14. Id. § 32-1510.42(a) (Cum. Supp. 1971).

15. Id.
16. 258 S.C. 397, 189 S.E.2d 7, appeal dismissed mem., 93 S. Ct. 430 (1972). See
generally Survey of S.C. Constitutional Law infra.
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selling liquor illegally, suspended the plaintiff's permits but of17
fered the payment of a fine as an alternative to the suspension.
Appeal to the supreme court followed the lower court's affirmation of this order.
The motel lounge was licensed to sell beer, wine and set-ups
but was prohibited from dispensing liquor over a certain alcoholic
content in mixed drinks.'" At the time of the violation the lounge
was charging for the set-ups and ostensibly "giving" the liquor to
its customers. The court held that the lounge's purported "gift"
to its customers was just a subterfuge intended to evade the law. 9
Since monetary consideration passed to the lounge, the true nature of the transaction was a sale and not a gift."0
. The plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the statutes
involved on grounds of indefiniteness and arbitrariness. The
court, however, rejected these contentions, finding that the South
Carolina Constitution2 and pertinent statutes 22 provided clear
warning to the plaintiff that his conduct was illegal. Also, the
court felt that the language of Pirates' Cove, Inc. v. Strom,2 to
which the plaintiff had been a party, was sufficiently clear to
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-27.7 (Cum. Supp. 1971) provides in part: "The Alcoholic
Beverage Control Commission shall impose a monetary penalty as an alternate [sic] to
revocation or suspension in all cases where the Commission has the authority to suspend
or revoke a license or permit. .. ."
18. S.C. CONsT. art. 8,§ 11 provides in part:

In the exercise of the police power the General Assembly shall have the right to
prohibit the manufacture and sale and retail of alcoholic liquors or beverages
within the State . .

.

.Provided, that no license shall be granted to sell alco-

holic beverages in less quantities than one-half pint ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-78 (1962) provides in part:
No retail dealer shall:
(1) Sell, offer for sale, barter, exchange, give, transfer or deliver or permit to be
sold, bartered, exchanged, given, transferred or delivered any alcoholic liquors
in less quantities than one-half pint ....
19. 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 244 (1947) states:
In any case, where a sale or gift of liquor would be contrary to law, the courts
will discountenance any trick, artifice, or subterfuge intended to evade its terms.
No matter what the disguise or pretense, it is enough to sustain a conviction if
liquor was actually sold or given in violation of the law ....
20. See Survey of Criminal Law and Procedure infra.
21. S.C. CONST. art. 8,§ 11, quoted in note 18 supra.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-31 (1962) provides in part: "The Commission shall have sole
and exclusive power to grant, issue, suspend and revoke all licenses provided for in this
chapter." Id. § 4-91 (1962) provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person to...
sell..,, any alcoholic liquors. . . except in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
23. 249 S.C. 270, 153 S.E.2d 900 (1967).
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eradicate any remaining doubts. The court said, "The very fact
that liquor was dispensed in this most unusual way indicates that
appellant understood the law he attempted to evade. ' 24 The fact
that state law prohibited retailers from selling alcohol in quantities smaller than one-half pint did not of itself make the statutory
scheme arbitrary or violative of the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution:
Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom
and utility of legislation ....
The doctrine. . . that due process authorizes courts to hold
laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely . . .has long since been discarded. We have
returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do
not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment
of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.2
The court also rejected the plaintiffs claims that the statutes
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce and denied
him equal protection of the law. The fact that motels in Georgia
but not those in South Carolina were allowed to serve their customers mixed drinks did not, in the eyes of the court, render
South Carolina's statutes an impermissible burden upon interstate commerce. Similarly, the statute authorizing railroads and
airlines to sell liquor by the drink to their passengers on interstate
trains and aircraft did not deny the plaintiff equal protection. In
concluding, the court stated:
Discrimination results only where like things are treated
differently, or where different things are treated alike. The differences between innkeepers and common carriers are obvious.
The liquor which appellant would serve to his customers has
come to rest in this State. The liquor served aboard interstate
2
trains and aircraft, and the passengers themselves, have not. 1
In Smith v. Pratt7 the Commission appealed to the supreme
court from a judgment of the lower court ordering issuance of a
beer and wine permit. The plaintiff had filed with the Commission for renewal of his permit, the issuance of which was protested
24.
25.
26.
27.

258 S.C. at 405, 189 S.E.2d at 10 (1972).
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
258 S.C. at 408, 189 S.E.2d at 11-12 (1972).
258 S.C. 504, 189 S.E.2d 301 (1972).
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by nearby Epworth Children's Home. The Commission held a
hearing after which it declined to renew the permit because it
considered the location unsuitable for the sale of beer and wine.
The lower court held that there was no competent evidence to
support the finding that the location was unsuitable and the supreme court affirmed.
The language of the statute"8 concerning issuance of such a
permit demonstrates that the Commission has broad discretion
in determining the suitability of a location, but the court stated
that "this discretion is not an unlimited one and does not authorize a determination of unsuitability which is wholly unsupported
by any competent evidence. '29 The testimony that Epworth presented at the hearing concerned problems with teen-agers obtaining beer and wine at the plaintiff's store, but this evidence consisted almost entirely of generalities, opinions, and hearsay.
The fact that the plaintiff's store was located only 1000 feet
from the entrance to Epworth was not in itself enough to render
the location unsuitable for a beer and wine permit. The court
pointed out that there were no statutory guidelines with respect
to the proximity of a holder of a beer and wine permit to establishments such as churches, schools, or playgrounds (Epworth
maintains all three), although there were such guidelines for retail liquor stores." The court also asserted that the essence of
Epworth's objection to the plaintiffs having a permit was not
unsuitability of location but rather alleged illegal sales of beer to
minors. While proof of such an illegal sale would constitute
grounds for permit revocation, the court pointed out that a permit
could not be so revoked without giving the licensee the alternative
of paying a fine.3 1 Because the licensee was not offered this alternative, the Commission's failure to renew his permit was an unlawful action. The court therefore affirmed the lower court's de28. S.C.

CODE ANN. § 4-212 (1962) provides in part:
No permit authorizing the sale of beer or wine shall be issued unless:

(6) The location of the proposed place of business of applicant shall in the
opinion of the Tax Commission be a proper one.
29. 258 S.C. at 507, 189 S.E.2d at 302 (1972).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-33.1 (1962) provides in part: "The Commission shall not
grant or issue any license provided for in this chapter if the place of business is within
three hundred feet of any church, school, or playground situated within a municipality
31. Id. § 4-27.7 (Cum. Supp. 1971), quoted in note 17 supra.
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termination that the Commission's finding of unsuitability of location was without the support of any competent evidence.
Nevertheless, Justice Littlejohn, with Chief Justice Moss
concurring, dissented and would have upheld the Commission's
refusal to renew the beer and wine permit. They did not agree
that the finding of the Commission was entirely without evidentiary support. Instead they felt that the hearsay evidence introduced by Epworth should have been considered and given probative weight because the hearing was an administrative proceeding
32
and there was no objection to the evidence.
RONALD P. JOHNSON
32. 2 AM. Jun. 2d AdministrativeLaw § 382 (1962) provides in part: "Nevertheless,
hearsay evidence is generally held admissible in proceedings before administrative agencies, at least for limited purposes, especially when not objected to."
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